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Plus a change, plus c'est la "tnte chose.1
In recent decades the demand has become increasingly insistent among
scholars and others for development of a more comprehensive theory of
inquiry about international law, drawing upon all relevant areas of knowledge
and especially upon the social sciences. 2 Early in his very ambitious book
Professor Friedmann states that:
The changes in the dimensions of international law require a corre-
sponding reorientation in its study; neither the international lawyer
trained in the classical methods of international law and diplomacy
nor the corporation, tax, or constitutional lawyer are equipped to
handle this subject without cooperation with each other, and with
economists and political scientists. International law is becoming
a more and more complex and many-sided subject.3
In bringing the book to a close, he reaffirms that basic changes in the "struc-
ture of international society" make necessary a "far-reaching reorientation
in the science and study of contemporary international law."4
For any who are as yet unconvinced of the exigency of this demand,
Professor Friedmann's able and wide-ranging survey of almost all of the
more important and controversial areas of contemporary international law
may serve as compelling proof. By intention and example, this book makes
a conclusive case for the view that an inter-disciplinary approach and an
inter-disciplinary jurisprudence offer the only effective means for delimiting
t By Wolfgang Friedmann. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964. PP. xvi,
410. $8.75.
* Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School. A.B., University of Mississippi,
1926; B.C.L., University of Oxford, 1930; J.S.D., Yale, 1931; L.H.D., Columbia, 1954.
** Graduate Fellow in Law, Yale Law School. A.B., Johns Hopkins, 1960; LL.B.,
Faculty of Law, Hebrew University, 1963; LL.M., Yale, 1964.
1. Ancient jurisprudential proverb.
2. A recent eloquent statement of this demand, with abundant references, is Falk,
The Adequacy of Contemporary Theories of International Law-Gaps in Legal Thinking,
50 VA. L. REv. 231 (1964). See also CARLSTON, LAW AND ORGANIZATION IN WORLD
SocIErY (1962) ; FOREIGN POLICY DEcISION-MAXING (Snyder, Bruck & Sapin eds. 1962) ;
INTERNATIONAL Polrrics AND FOREIGN POLICY (Rosenau ed. 1961) ; KAPLAN & KATZEN.
BACH, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1961); ROSECRANCE,
ACTION AND REACTION IN WORLD POLITICS (1963); THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
(Knorr & Verba eds. 1961); THE POLITICS OF THE DEVELOPING AREAS (Almond &
Coleman eds. 1960); Lasswell, The Interrelations of World Organization and Society,
55 YALE L.J. 889 (1946).
3. P. 70.
4. Pp. 367-68.
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and managing an area of inquiry which bristles with inter-disciplinary
problems. The mere substantiation of this case, even without Professor
Friedmann's excellent survey of, and penetrating comments upon, the main
features of contemporary international law would make this book a significant
contribution to a much neglected field and afford further evidence of the
author's superior scholarship. Such evidence is, of course, superfluous for
readers of the previous works of this distinguished and prolific publicist.
It must be regretfully noted, however, that the book reveals many gaps in
thinking and many perplexing features. Despite the fact that Friedmann, in
both title and text, manifests his awareness of the connection between interna-
tional relations and international law, in no place in the book is this nexus
clearly spelled out. An adequate theory describing the interrelations of com-
munity process and authoritative decision and indicating their implications for
the study of international law is not presented. Even more puzzling is the fact
that despite the author's crie de coeur cited above, his primary and secondary
sources are almost exclusively "legal" and "doctrinal." 5 The fruitful and
provocative work in the social sciences that has enriched the international law
field in the last two decades is neither mentioned nor, apparently, drawn upon.6
The principal thesis of Friedmann's book is that, during the formative
period of international law, conflict was perceived as the main instrument for
serving "national interest"; as a result, classical international law was almost
exclusively concerned with the regulation of this conflict. Professor Fried-
mann calls this traditional law the international "law of coexistence," 7 since
it aimed to do little more than maintain the existence of a small number
of nation-states. In the contemporary period, the notif of conflict as the
means of realizing national interest has been supplanted by cooperation in
many areas of international endeavor. Thus Friedmann finds that alongside
the continuing international "law of coexistence," an international "law of
cooperation" is developing. Conflict and cooperation, he asserts, are both
5. See pp. 383-96.
6. See, in this regard, Professor Falk's criticism in his review. Book Review, 3
COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 256, 262 (1965).
7. Professor Friedmann apparently assumes that the term "coexistence" derives a
stable reference from classical international law and that the U.S.S.R. proffers the term
"coexistence" in good faith.
It is indeed only because the phrase is widely used by Communist leaders and
forms an acknowledged objective of Soviet diplomacy that it has come to be
suspect to important segments of western, and in particular United States',
opinion. The international diplomacy of coexistence means nothing more or
less than the continuation of the classical system of international law ....
P. 15. Subsequently, in discussing it in its Panch Shila formulation (p. 323), he notes
that some of the tenets of coexistence are ambiguous, and he elsewhere suggests further
qualifications. See pp. 335, 336. For a somewhat different analysis of Soviet strategy in
the use of the term, see MCWniNNEY, PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND SOVIET-WESMRN
INTmNATioNAL LAW (1964); Lipson, Peaceful Coezistence, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
871 (1964); McWhinney, Peaceful Coexistence and Soviet-Western International Law,
56 AM. J. INT'L L. 951 (1962). See also McDOUGAL, LASSWnzL & V.Asic, LAW AND
PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 131, 448-49 (1963), for discussion and further references.
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instruments of national interest, but in the context of changing international
society, there is a growing realization that national interest can be best
served by cooperation.
If the author's major purpose is to provide a theory of inquiry about
international law, adequate to locate it in the broader context of international
relations and to promote its improvement for general community goals, then
-unfortunately-his aspirations have exceeded his grasp. The two-tiered "co-
existence-cooperation" description of international law, similar to Schwarzen-
berger's "international law of reciprocity and international law of coordina-
tion,"8 though responsive to certain contemporary features of the largest
community process, is, in the final analysis, a rule-oriented jurisprudence
with all the defects and limitations from which such a jurisprudence must
suffer. It could scarcely be expected that a jurisprudence of this type could
establish and maintain a consistent observational standpoint in inquiry or
provide an adequate delimitation of the focus of attention for comprehensive
and realistic study of the relevant features of the international social process,
or facilitate performance of the various intellectual tasks that imperatively
confront any serious inquirer-whether scholar, international decision-maker,
national decision-maker, advocate, or community member. In the necessarily
brief survey which follows it may be seen that Professor Friedmann does
not overcome the difficulties inherent in his most general theoryY
1. CLARITY IN OBSERVATIONAL STANDPOINT
One prerequisite for an effective theory of inquiry about any kind of
law is the establishment and maintenance of a consistent observational stand-
point. Few will question that the perspectives from which one views a partic-
ular matter or flow of events affect perception and, as a result, evaluation. A
comprehensive theory about international law must note different possible
observational standpoints and then clarify and maintain its own.
8. For a recent statement, see SCHWARZENBERGER, THE FRONTIERS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1962). Similar formulations may be found in ARON, PAIX FT GUERRE ENTRE LES
NATIONS (1962). CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS 1919-1939 (2d ed. 1946) is
probably the first formulation of the "split level" approach to international law.
9. The criteria which we apply in appraisal of Professor Friedmann's theory of
inquiry are designed to test, from policy-oriented perspectives, the adequacy of any
proffered jurisprudence. The principal point we would make in their application here
is that Professor Friedmann's theory is not adequate to serve the goals which he
explicitly sets for himself. (Note the references in the first paragraph of this review
and his other statements of preference for a policy-oriented approach. E.g., p. 68.) A
more detailed statement of the criteria and principles employed here may be found in
McDougal, Sonve Basic Theoretical Concepts About International Law: A Policy-
Oriented Framework of Inquiry, 4 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 327 (1960). See also
McDougal & Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public
Order, in STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 3 (1960); Lasswell & McDougal, Legal
Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, in id. at 42.
It should not require emphasis that the measure of deference we accord Professor
Friedmann's work is best indicated not by the number or sharpness of particular criticisms,
but rather by the total amount of attention we accord to his book.
[Vol. 65:810
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One aid to consistency in observational standpoint is recognition of
the distinction between theories about law as contrasted with theories of
law. When a jurisprudence fails to distinguish the theories required by a
scholarly observer for the performance of his intellectual tasks from the0
theories employed by the participants in the social process in making and
justifying decisions (theories which are in fact a part of the events being
observed), serious distortions in perception and reporting may occur. One
of the gravest distortions that is attendant upon failure to determine and
to maintain a consistent observational standpoint is the inability to dis-
tinguish a comprehensive community perspective from that of particular
participants. This is illustrated by the indiscriminate use of key terms as
different participants would use them, without appreciating that these terms
have different connotations for each participant. An examination of Fried-
mann's use of the term "national interest" will demonstrate that the author
has fallen into this error.
The term "national interest" is a fundamental concept in Friedmann's
thesis. Great pains are taken to distinguish "conflicts of interest" between
participants from "conflicts of value" and "conflicts of ideology" in order
to develop a notion of a "community of interests."' If any of these terms
are given consistent empirical references that might serve as a basis for
distinction, Friedmann does not explicitly present them to the reader. By
"national interest" does he mean such interest as determined by the officials
of a particular state, by a decision-maker representing a larger community,
or by a scholarly observer? The observational standpoint for "national
interest" shifts constantly in the book. Indeed, the very adoption and em-
ployment of the terms "national" and "international" interest foredoom
efforts to achieve clarification and to make important recommendations. The
distinction between "national" and "international" interest posits a dichotomy
between the two; but the dichotomy is unreal. The scholarly observer would
note that the same interest may be both "national" and "international." Such
a standpoint, if maintained, would allow for distinctions both (1) between
general community interest as perceived by the observer and as perceived by
the community members and (2) between general community interests, who-
ever does the perceiving, and the interests of particular participant states.
The "national-international" distinction cuts across these standpoints and
obscures the fact that in a given context the most important "national" inter-
ests of a particular state may be its inclusive ("international") interests with
other states.
Professor Friedmann, in his function of supplying intelligence and
recommendations to the general community decision-makers, could most
10. See pp. 45-59.
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profitably take the position of the scholarly observer. From this vantage point
he might distinguish-in terms of a comprehensive set of values and the con-
ditions affecting the achievement of such values-first, between the common
interests of all community members and the special interests that any par-
ticular member may assert against the whole community irrespective of
consequences for the others, and second, as among the common interests
of members, between those which are inclusive, in the sense that they may be
enjoyed by all in the same modality (such as with respect to access to the
oceans or the air-space over the oceans) and those which are exclusive in
the sense that all may have comparable interests but not in precisely the
same modality (such as with respect to the enjoyment of internal waters or
of a territorial sea).11 With these categories, or equivalents that make the
same distinctions and avoid the simple dichotomy between "national" and
"international," Professor Friedmann might clarify the common interests of
community members as he, the observer, perceives them; note the interests
that are in fact asserted by particular community members; and, finally,
appraise all asserted interests in terms of the degree of their compatibility
with the clarified common interests for which he has assumed responsibility
in recommendation. An analysis along these lines might, in appropriate
performance of the tasks incumbent upon scholars, serve as a valuable guide
both to established community decision-makers and to other responsible com-
munity members.
Reticence in clarifying the precise content of the term "national interest"
in particular situations has detracted from the value of the book. "National
interest," as defined by Friedmann, means little more than that states in
the international social process pursue objectives. This truism is of little
descriptive value and, more serious, it incapacitates its author from making
important recommendations to international decision-makers. Certainly, Pro-
fessor Friedmann will not propose that all objectives are or should be treated
by a decision-maker as equal. In some few instances, Friedmann attempts
to strike a more comprehensive, evaluative stance, but these infrequent and
hesitating steps in the right direction are unsuccessful due to the failure
to maintain this observational stand throughout the book and from it to
perform the requisite intellectual tasks.
One of Friedmann's discussions of power will serve to demonstrate our
point. Friedmann appears to state that pursuit of power per se is unlawful,
but the pursuit of power as the means of achieving other values is lawful.
12
11. It will be noted that we define interests in terms of demanded values plus
attendant expectations about the conditions affecting the achievement of such values. The
descriptive categories we recommend are discussed in more detail in McDOUtGAL,
LAsswE. & VLAsIc, op. cit. supra note 7, at 141-90.
12. See p. 50. Professor Friedmann's precise words are:
Power, as a means of attaining a given objective, is a necessary and ethically
neutral instrument of politics. But the pursuit of power, as a goal of national
(Vol. 65:810
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Applying this, the author holds that certain objectives or "national interests"
of Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy were unlawful.'3 This formula is not,
however, explicitly related to a comprehensive set of overriding values in-
cluding conceptions of the appropriate sharing and management of power.
Its ambiguity and plasticity become apparent in wider application. Thus, the
Italian campaign in Africa prior to World War II could be said to have been
manipulation of power with the aim of achieving wealth and respect. Pro-
fessor Friedmann would undoubtedly be among the first to condemn such
action. This finding could not, however, be based on his own ambiguous
formula but rather on what he would be forced to describe as "extra-legal"
factors.
II. DELIMITATION OF THE Focus OF INQUIRY
The pre-eminent contribution of Professor Friedmann's book is its
recognition and description of the realities of the contemporary international
social process. An initial assumption of "changing structures" permits Fried-
mann to remove traditional blinders and to note many significant phases of
the world social process. Unfortunately, the lack of a comprehensive theory
and an effective terminology has caused the author to overlook key facets.
The result is an incomplete survey, not easily adapted to facilitating per-
formance of the various necessary intellectual tasks.
The wide review of the participants in the contemporary international
social process is one of the strongest parts of the book. Friedmann examines,
often in impressive detail, the influx of a variety of new participants: new
states,14 international organizations, 15 nongovernmental organizations, 16 inter-
national corporations and individuals.' 7 To be sure, the broadening spectrum
of participants has been observed and commented upon by others,' 8 but a
detailed study of the impact of this phenomenon on international decision and
public order remains to be undertaken. It is regrettable that Dr. Friedmann
has not pushed beyond the broad frontiers of the changes he depicts. The
discussion of "conflicts between corporate loyalties and public national poli-
cies"' 9 is inconclusive. Friedmann fails to grasp that this is only one effect
(and not the most important) of an increasing concentricity of identifications.
Similarly, the discussion of internal democratization (which is subsequently
or personal politics, represents a specific ideal, antithetic to the ideals of in-
ternational order, peace and cooperation.
13. See pp. 51, 254 n.1, 267-68.
14. See pp. 31-32.
15. See, e.g., pp. 96-114, 153-59, .253-74.
16. See p. 38.
17. See pp. 40-44, 232-49.
18. See, e.g., JEssuP, A MODERN LAW oF NATioNs 15-42 (1948); LAUTMEPACET,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 12-47 (1950).
19. See pp. 29-30.
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negated) 20 is vitiated by the fact that Friedmann, though paying lip service
to a transnational social process, continually conceives separate arenas of inter-
national and municipal law that intersect only at fixed nodal points.2 1 Some-
what inconsistently and inexplicably, Friedmann, in a later part of the book,
returns to the logomachous "subjectivity-objectivity" concepts of a different
era.2
The changing structures of international law include changing objectives.
Elucidation of this phase of the social process remains wanting. "Cooperation"
is sometimes used in this sense, but the precise denotation of the term remains
unclear, for Friedmann presses it into double-duty as a strategy. His use of
the term "common interest" lacks both the breath of life and detailed specifica-
tion. When applied to the "law of coexistence," it means little more than a
stalemate.2 3 When applied to the "law of cooperation," it is a label (applied
subsequently) to areas of interaction in which a noticeable degree of institu-
tionalization has been achieved 2 4 The split-level approach obfuscates "com-
mon interest" in a variety of value processes as it is perceived by both effective
participants and objective observers. It is not surprising that Friedmann
discerns it primarily in the economic sphere and remains skeptical about its
existence in others.
There is little explicit discussion of the changing situations of inter-
action, geographic or temporal, or of the changing bases of power of the
many different participants. The discussion of changing strategies deals only
with the restrictions that the destructiveness of contemporary weapons places
upon use of the military strategy, and even this observation suffers from
overgenerality.2 5 The delineation of the changing outcomes of the social
process in the production and distribution of demanded values is too narrow.
Friedmann dwells on resultant interdependence in the wealth process but
fails to examine outcomes in a variety of other value processes. The author's
manifesto on the defectiveness of a security regime based on regional orga-
nizations is presented dogmatically2 with no analysis or reasons in support
of the conviction.
Despite, therefore, Professor Friedmann's frequent mention of a world
20. Compare p. 7, with pp. 42-44.
21. Thus, at pp. 7-8, Friedmann regards treaty ratification as the area that is affected
primarily by internal democratization. The argument is premised on the assumption that
"the principal legal implementation of important international decisions is the Treaty."
22. See pp. 232-49.
23. It is significant that Friedmann adopts Morgenthau's definition of law as "the
natural ideological ally of the status quo" to characterize the law of coexistence (at p.
58), but rejects it for his law of cooperation. The real implication of Friedmann's law
of coexistence becomes clear from a variety of statements the author makes throughout
the book. See, e.g., the "balance of power" statement at p. 85.
24. See text accompanying notes 109-10 infra.
25. See pp. 259-74.
26. See p. 258. This, again, would appear to be a particularization of Friedmann's
general rejection of didoublement fonctionnel.
[Vol. 65:810
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social process, transnational in character, embracing many different partici-
pants and resulting in varying degrees of interdependence, it must be con-
cluded that his delimitation of the broader focus of his inquiry is inadequate.
His illumination of the larger community process is patchy, and a variety
of half-conceptions and misconceptions lead to inaccurate conclusions. This
will become more apparent as we examine his conceptions of authority and
control and of the role they play in the different social and community
processes.
A. Balance of Emphasis Upon Perspectives and Operations
In policy-relevant inquiry about international law, as indeed about any
law, a writer must place balanced emphasis upon both perspectives and
operations. Friedmann's criticisms of other schools for their failure to focus
on both these factors are quite valid.27 In unfolding his own jurisprudence,
he attempts to strike this balance. Rejecting the d~doublement fonctionnel
doctrine2 8 (which will be analysed in more detail below), Friedmann is forced
to admit that an effective sanctioning process does not prevail for the "law
of coexistence." 29 Yet he convinces himself of the existence or "reality" of
this stratum of international law through its "recognition and observance"
by the major participants.3 0 On a verbal level, this satisfies the balanced em-
phasis requirement. But Friedmann can neither substantiate his definition nor
follow it in the rest of the book. Thus, for example, he states:
Overwhelmingly, however, international disputes are tested and
judged by reference to international law, even though, depending
on a variety of factors of power and opportunity, the contestants
may distort the facts or the law in their own interest.31
Yet the reader will discover, to his surprise, that Friedmann's examples for
this assertion are Berlin, Vietnam, Laos and the Congo.3 2 One can scarcely
know whether he seeks to illustrate his major proposition or its qualification.
Apparently even Professor Friedmann is somewhat uncomfortable with these
examples, for elsewhere he discusses the theory that posits the existence of in-
ternational law on the fact that its subjects "feel a sense of obligation in regard
to the rules of international law.' 33 This formulation would seem to represent
Professor Friedmann's considered opinion, as he reverts to it in his summary
and conclusions at the end of the book. There he bases the reality of inter-
national law on the "rule of recognition" ;34 the "observance" component has
been dropped. Emphasis has shifted exclusively to perspectives.
27. See pp. 82-84.
28. See p. 84. But cf. p. 92 n.18.




33. P. 82. (Emphasis added.)
34. P. 369.
1965]
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Though there is considerable reference to both rules and practices, the
emphasis that dominates the author's discussion is upon "rules." The con-
ception of law as a body of rules or norms appears explicitly in a number
of places.3 5 Even when Friedmann speaks more broadly of "process," it is a
process for the articulation of rules.3 6 The concept of lacuna or a non liquet
judgment is a logical corollary of a rule-oriented jurisprudence; it cannot
obtain in a jurisprudence based on a process of decision. Friedmann's vacilla-
tion between rules and decision is brought out clearly in his discussion of
non liquet. On the basis of doctrinal authority, he denies it ;37 yet in his dis-
cussion of vital issues, he hearkens back to it.
38
B. Clarity in Conception of Authority and Control
The distinction between authority and control also suffers severely from
the split-level approach to international law. Although Professor Friedmann
distinguishes between authority and control in a number of places in his
book, the distinction is thoroughly confused when it is applied to problems of
the "law of coexistence." The reader's suspicion that the "law of coexistence"
is no more than a synonym for the controlling situation receives early con-
firmation when the author adopts Morgenthau's definition of international
law to characterize the stratum of coexistence. 9 The failure to grasp and
apply the distinction recurs in the author's discussion of maintenance of peace
among the Big Five:
Politically, the maintenance of peace in such conditions depends not
on legal sanctions but on the balance of power between the major
states. This is, in effect, the contemporary position.
40
The confusion recurs in one of the many disquisitions on sovereignty:
[A] national state has always the power, as distinct from the right,
to violate international obligations. This is a hallmark of national
sovereignty.
41
It is worth noting that this use of the term sovereignty differs from the
author's other uses of the term throughout the book. Some observations on
the inaccuracy of the statement will be made below.
The distinction between authority and control languishes again in Fried-
mann's study of aggression and self-defense, in which he mentions, but does
not adequately dispose of, the contrasting views of Professor Henkin on the
35. See, e.g., pp. 60, 81, 118, 140, 152-87.
36. See, e.g., pp. 140, 152. But see p. 299, where state practice is taken into account.
For an indication of what is involved in taking seriously the conception of law as a
process of authoritative decision, see Mayo & Jones, Legal-Policy Decision Process:
Alterniative thinking and the Predictive Function, 33 GEO. WASH. L. Ray. 318 (1964).
37. See pp. 174, 189 n.3.
38. See pp. 146-48; text accompanying notes 62-63 infra.




HeinOnline -- 65 Colum. L. Rev. 818 1965
CHANGING STRUCTURE I
one hand and former Secretary Dean Acheson on the other.42 Similarly, in
his attempt to establish the "reality" or "binding character" of international
law, noted above, Professor Friedmann fails to extricate himself cleanly
from certain inherited confusions about the relevance of consent. 43 The tra-
ditional argument against the relevance of consent, here illustrated by a
quotation from Fitzmaurice who builds upon Brierly and others, is that con-
sent cannot serve as an indication of "binding character" since its very in-
vocation is to argue in a circle. This of course ignores the fact that "consent"
may be employed at many different levels of generality. Professor Friedmann
appears to dismiss the traditional confusions as "fragile constructions" and
to offer instead tests in terms of "recognition and observance." 44 These terms
do not, however, amount to a clear distinction between authority and control,
and the difficulties Professor Friedmann has with them have already been
indicated. When the mystical debate about the "reality," the "binding char-
acter," the "basis of obligation," and so on of international law is resolved
into empirical questions about the distribution of authority and control, it is
easy to frame a comprehensive set of questions whose answers might give
appropriate guidance to decision-makers and community members. 45
C. Comprehensiveness in Conception of Law as a Process of Authoritative
Decision
Professor Friedmann's conception of law as a response to events in the
social process, a response which in turn conditions the social process, 46 has
impelled him to a contextual examination. Logically, one would have expected
him to progress to the notion of a comprehensive constitutive process of
authoritative decision for the entire world arena. The visitors in flying
saucers who observe our earth can undoubtedly see that for the earth com-
munity as a whole, as well as for each of its internal territorial communities,
there is a comprehensive process of decision, sustained by dispositions of
effective power, which identifies certain decision-makers as authoritative
for the whole community, prescribes the criteria by which decisions are to
be taken, establishes appropriate structures of authority for the interaction
of claimants, allocates important bases of power among the established de-
cision-makers, authorizes and regulates the employment of a variety of
strategies or instruments of policy in aid of decision, and finally produces a
continuous flow of particular decisions in resolution of controversies between
claimants about the shaping and sharing of the different values sought in
42. See pp. 259-60 & n.12a.
43. See p. 85.
44. See p. 86.
45. A more detailed discussion of this problem appears in McDouGAL & FE -cAmo,
LAW AND MInIMUM WORLD PuBLic ORE 275-79 (1961).
46. See, e.g., id. at 1, 77, 117.
19651
HeinOnline -- 65 Colum. L. Rev. 819 1965
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
the world social process. 47 The decisions that establish this most compre-
hensive process are what we mean by "constitutive" decisions; the continuous
flow of decisions about various value processes which come out of the most
comprehensive process may conveniently be called "public order" decisions.
Unfortunately, this concept of a comprehensive constitutive process of au-
thoritative decision appears to elude Professor Friedmann. Certainly he
makes no explicit use of such a concept: at one point he laments the
"absence of international constitutional organs entrusted with the functions
of legislation, administration, and adjudication" ;48 when he employs the
heading "International Constitutional Law," he refers to the internal proc-
esses of intergovernmental organizations ;49 and late in the book he makes a
curious distinction between "constitutional" and "functional" approaches,
in which "constitutional" appears to be the equivalent of "utopian."" ° Since
Professor Friedmann does not achieve a conception of a comprehensive consti-
tutive process, he is, of course, incapable of distinguishing between constitutive
and public order decisions.
One source of Professor Friedmann's difficulty appears to stem from his
reticence in applying the functional approach that he praises.r' He constantly
voices a preference for international norms that emanate from centralized
institutions. 52 Friedmann's rejection of Scelle demonstrates a failure to under-
stand an unorganized process of decisionY3 Without this notion, a compre-
hension of the international constitutive process is, of course, impossible.
In addition, an understanding of the process of international prescription,
to which Friedmann devotes a large part of his book, is disproportionately
restricted to those processes manifesting a high degree of internal organization.
That part of the book which is devoted to the processes of change by
authoritative decision5 4 suffers from many grave defects. The term decision,
when comprehensively considered, may be seen to comprise a variety of dif-
ferent authority functions. 55 Friedmann has treated only two of them-
47. For a detailed study, see McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & VLASlc, op. cit. supra note 7,
at 94-137.
48. P. 119.
49. See p. 153.
50. See pp. 275-77.
51. See ibid.
52. See, e.g., pp. 119, 153, 371, 373.
53. See p. 148. For a presentation of a different point of viev, see KEETON &
SCHWARZENBERGER, MAKING INTERNATIONAL LAW WORK 40-43 (2d ed. 1946); 1
SCELLE, PREcis DE DROIT DES GENS 43, 56, 217 (1932); 2 id. at 10, 319-28 (1932);
Lenhoff, Reciprocity and the Law of Foreign Judgments: A Historical-Critical Analsis,
16 LA. L. REV. 465 (1956) ; Lenhoff, Reciprocity: The Legal Aspect of a Perennial Idea
49 Nw. U.L. REV. 619, 752 (1955); Lenhoff, Reciprocity in Function: A Problem oj
Conflict of Laws, Constitutional Law, and International Law, 15 U. PIT'. L. REV. 44
(1953); cf. MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SociETY 23, 31-32 (1926).
For additional discussion, see McDOtGAL & FzIclANo, op. cit. supra note 45, at 296-301.
54. Pp. 117-51, 213-20.
55. For a detailed examination of seven different decision functions, see McDouGAL,
T-JSSWELL & VLASIC, op. cit. supra note 7, at 113-27. An insightful description
of the prescribing function as a process of communication appears in Schachter,
[Vol. 65:810
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prescription and application. Too often, Article 38 of the Statute of the Inter-
national Court is accepted as an homogenous and exhaustive description of
"the sources" of international law. Professor Friedmann moves quickly
beyond this, but unfortunately fails to develop an adequate theory of prescrip-
tion in terms of a comprehensive process of communication. This and the
orientation toward organized institutions, noted above, contribute to the
inadequacies of his discussion of custom.56 Chapter 10 indiscriminately mixes
prescription (as the outcome of the process), prescribers, objectives, situations
and strategies. But the prescribing roles of the International Law Commission
and the Sixth Committee are given excellent treatment. Although Professor
Friedmann shies away from authoritative unilateral decision made with
promise of reciprocity and so accepted, in economic matters he stresses pre-
scribing through a process of claim and counterclaim as a means of maxi-
mizing overall value position.
57
The discussion of the prescribing role of national courts is perplexing
in itself and inconsistent with much that was stated earlier in the book.
Though Friedmann is focusing on prescription, he enjoins national courts
to prescribe only when there is pre-existing consensus.5s (Is there then any
need to prescribe?) Friedmann argues that national courts should not pre-
scribe in controversial areas because they are prone to national prejudice and
policies.59 Apparently Professor Friedmann believes that Foreign Office staff
and members of the International Law Commission and the Sixth Committee
are less prone to these prejudices and are more objective. Sabbatinoo° is
praised:
The Supreme Court by this reversal struck a powerful blow for a
dispassionate approach by national courts to sensitive problems of
international law, contrary to the claim of many groups and writers
that non-recognition of the Cuban nationalisation legislation would
strengthen international law. The purpose of these assertions is the
judicial affirmation of a doctrine of expropriation which is deeply
controversial in contemporary international law. As the Supreme
Court pointed out, "it is difficult to imagine the Courts of this
country embarking on adjudication in an area which touches more
sensitively the practice and ideological goals of the various members
of the community of nations."61
Friedmann quite realistically castigates the concept of non liquet, yet fails
to note that Sabbatino is a non liquet judgment. Why a national court should
take a "dispassionate approach" rather than seek to "strengthen international
The Relation of Law, Politics and Action in the United Nation, 109 RECUE1L DES GOURS
165, 171-84 (1963).
56. See pp. 121-23.
57. See p. 56.
58. See pp. 146-48.
59. See p. 147.
60. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
61. P. 148 n.71.
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law" is not explained. Praising an American court for "affirming a doctrine"
that is antithetic to public order values shared by the United States with
many other countries seems as perverse as would be praising the State De-
partment for not extending diplomatic protection to American nationals
abroad.62 If, as Friedmann states, the decisive agent of development of inter-
national rules is state practice, 8 it is difficult to understand why Friedmann,
on the same page, insists that the authoritative judicial organs of a state
should not participate in that development. Surely, judicial officials are no
more biased or any less capable than executive officials of clarifying the com-
mon interests of the territorial community they represent and other such
communities in controversies otherwise properly before them.
Friedmann's discussion of application is concerned primarily with sanc-
tions. The author does not accept sanctions applied by nation-state officials
acting as international decision makers-ddoublement fonctionnel--as lawful
international sanctions. 4 Thus, in the international "law of coexistence,"
where there is little "vertical" development, there are no effective sanctions.
In the international "law of cooperation," Professor Friedmann does find
effective international sanctions in the exclusion from access to benefits of
cooperative international oragnizations6 5 There are few international lawyers
who do not view with enthusiasm the development of international welfare
organizations in this generation. Their enthusiasm should not, however, lead
to the optimistic belief that these organizations are currently capable of
being effective in applying sanctions. In the first place, such action would
probably jeopardize the sanctioning organization. Secondly, the benefits that
most of these organizations dispense are only marginal. A recent study of
elites within developing countries revealed that bilateral aid was often pre-
ferred to and often easier to obtain than international aid.& 0
These criticisms of Professor Friedmann's thesis may, admittedly, be
ephemeral; it is not unlikely that these international organizations will one
day be capable of effective sanctioning. (How this change is to come about
without some fundamental changes in the "law of coexistence" remains mys-
62. See in this regard, Jennings, The Sabbatino Controversy, 20 REcoRD oF
N.Y.C.B.A. 81 (1965).
63. See p. 147.
64. See pp. 84, 148. Here again, Friedmann is inconsistent; subsequently he states:
"any sanction is an exercise of power by the stronger against the weaker and the decisive
test is in whose name it is exercised." P. 92 n.18. (Emphasis added.)
65. Professor Friedmann has not defined sanctions. In the course of his discussion,
he emphasizes the defects of sanction taken only as a deprivation and adopts Hart's
formulation, which can be criticized for over-emphasizing indulgences. Had Friedmann
taken a more comprehensive view of sanctions as techniques for supporting the primary
norms of a society, he might have identified a greater variety of sanctions and sanction
equivalents in the community's arsenal. See ARENS & LASSWELL, IN DEFENSE OF
PuBLic ORDER (1961); McDOUGAL & FELICiANO, op. cit. slupra note 45, at 261-385.
This approach would also have closed the conceptualistic gap between the laws of
coexistence and cooperation.
66. See RUBINSTEIN, THE SovIErs IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 40-51 (1964).
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terious.) Even within these international organizations, however, the d6-
doublement fonctionnel principle operates either directly or indirectly, until
changes in participants' identification patterns occur within Dr. Friedmann's
"law of coexistence." In certain organizations, such as the World Bank, elite
groups composed of nation-state representatives must apply the sanction ;67
in others, like the International Civil Aviation Organization, the nation-states
themselves must apply the sanction.68 Dr. Friedmann accepts these functional
double roles, because the sanctions are exercised in the name of a "genuine
organ of the international community. ' 69 He is not willing to determine if
this is being done functionally on the level of "coexistence."
One may note with satisfaction that although Professor Friedmann
formally adopts a rule-oriented approach, his actual detailed studies move
in more realistic and promising directions. His chapter on "general princi-
ples"70 as a means of developing international law norms provides a good
example. He starts by deploring a shortage of rules but quickly reveals that
general principles are camouflage for creative prescription. 71 His discussion
of unjust enrichment exhibits more policy thinking than comparative rule
study.72 One regrets that Professor Friedmann did not pursue this matter
further and state concrete recommendations on a lower level of abstraction.
The discussion of contrat administratif,73 a more rigorous comparative ap-
proach in the traditional sense, is somewhat circular and its conclusion does
little more than restate the problem. Professor Friedmann's note on the
philosophical origin of the distinction between public and private law and
its current anachronistic usage is excellent.
D. Relation of Processes of Authoritative Decision to Social Process
Although Professor Friedmann speaks of a comprehensive transnational
social process, he offers no set of terms or categories for describing the social
process events (those interactions transcending state lines) that give rise
to the claims to authority. Thus, the new "fields" of international law
described in chapter eleven are conceived largely in terms of bodies of rules,
without clear focus upon "factual" problems. The absence of a systematic
categorization, in social process terms, of the kinds of controversies that come
before decision-makers makes it difficult for Professor Friedmann to make
clear comparisons of decisions through time and across boundaries. Similarly,
67. Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, art. 6, § 2, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat 1454 (1946), T.I.A.S. No. 1502, at 17, 2 U.N.T.S.
No. 20(b), at 172.
68. Convention on International Civil Aviation, art. 87, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1205
(1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1591, at 31, 15 U.N.T.S. No. 102, at 354.
69. P. 92 n.18.
70. Pp. 188-212.
71. See pp. 189-90.
72. See pp. 206-10.
73. Pp. 200-06.
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in the absence of appropriate categorization there can be little suggestion of
ways to make systematic appraisals in social process terms of the consequences
of decision. It is, hence, this failure to devise an appropriate set of categories
for describing the social process events to which decisions are response and
in turn affect, which underlies Professor Friedmann's more basic failure to
establish his sought nexus between changing international relations and
international law.
When involved in detailed studies of the interrelation of the process of
authoritative decision and the social process, Professor Friedmann often
tends to narrow unduly the arenas of interaction. In his discussion of the
impact of internal democratization, for example, he restricts the effect of this
phenomenon to problems of treaty ratification.74 Similarly, the discussion of
the relations of international and national law is limited too often to treaties
and to court application.75 This narrow treatment belies the multiplicity
of interactions.
E. Relation of Authoritative Decision to Different Community Processes
Professor Friedmann tends to describe the relationship between inter-
national and national law in terms of hierarchies of rules rather than of in-
terpenetrating community processes." (It may be added that his failure to
clarify the multiplicity of interactions has led him to underestimate the
intensity of the struggle between contending world public orders.) Brief
reference has been made to the author's treatment of the impact of internal
democratization as bearing primarily upon treaty ratification. It should be
obvious that the impact of democratization on an internal decision process
will have marked effect on all the interactions between that process and other
processes. Friedmann's error appears to stem again from an excessive rule
orientation. Take, for example, the following statement:
[T] he question of the relative priorities of national and international
law, a problem of the hierarchy of legal norms, has to be distin-
guished from that of the content of any legal order . ... 7
The emphasis upon norms and their "hierarchies" rather than upon interpene-
trating processes makes it difficult for Friedmann to account for the new
European communities; hierarchical norm thinking forces him to treat them as
quasi-federations. 8
As Professor Friedmann proceeds, however, some of his observations on
this general problem demonstrate more insight. Thus he states:
74. See pp. 7-8.
75. See pp. 96-114.
76. See pp. 76, 77, 98, 299.
77. P. 77.
78. See pp. 98-99.
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[T] here is no clear-cut alternative between national and international
sovereignty, but a complex, evolving and checkered relationship.7 9
This, it is believed, is a more sophisticated notion of the interrelationship
under discussion, although it is still far from a comprehensive and realistic
description.
Throughout his discussion, the problem of sovereignty presents especial
difficulties for Professor Friedmann whose treatment of it reveals his failure
to grasp the realities of interpenetrating processes and interdependences. The
following statement may serve as an example:
[I]t remains generally true according to the present state of de-
velopment of general international law, that a national state has
always the power, as distinct from the right, to violate international
obligations. 0
Formerly, Friedmann had used the term "sovereignty" to denote an entity
that was not subordinate to any other authority.8 ' Here, however, the term
is used to describe an entity or participant that is subordinate to authority
but has sufficient effective control to repudiate that authority at will. In the
classical sense of sovereignty, which Friedmann himself had used, the state-
ment is incorrect. In the sense of effective control-the sense presented here
-it is inaccurate. A state such as the United States, which one may presume
to be a real and not "petty sovereign," certainly cannot do anything it wishes
without courting global disaster.8 2 In regard to either control or authority, the
term sovereignty is ambiguous and cannot be understood unless put in the con-
text of interpenetrating communities and their interdependences.
III. PERFORMANCE OF RELEVANT INTELLECTUAL TASKS
A comprehensive theory about international law, capable of facilitating
movement toward a public order of human dignity, must provide for the
employment of a variety of interrelated, but different, intellectual tasks. These
tasks may be usefully categorized as including the clarification of goals, the
description of past trends in decision, the analysis of conditions affecting
decision, the projection of future trends in decision, and the invention and
evaluation of policy alternatives. There need, of course, be no dogmatic order
in the performance, or inexorable routines for the fulfillment of these intel-
lectual tasks. The modality of their use is dictated by the context of the par-
ticular problem, and effectiveness in the performance of any particular task
79. P. 113.
80. P. 110; see text accompanying note 41 supra.
81. See pp. 82-84.
82. See in this regard Singer's application of the difference between "fate control"
and "behavior control" to the United States and Cuba. Singer, Inter-Nation Influence:
A Formal Model, 57 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 420, 422 n.5 (1963). See generally THIBAULT
& KELLEY, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GRouPs (1959).
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may depend upon effectiveness in the performance of the others. Professor
Friedmann's conception of the goals of his inquiry are stated, early in the
book, quite narrowly,83 but as the book proceeds there is a marked effort to
move beyond a mere contemplative study. Unfortunately, this endeavor is
hampered by the failure to identify and distinguish the different tasks. Thus,
though Professor Friedmann acquits himself quite notably in the performance
of some of the intellectual tasks on some problems, there is no systematic and
sustained examination of the whole range of important problems with which
he is concerned.
A. Clarification of Community Policies
Professor Friedmann praises policy-oriented jurisprudence 4 and applies
it in some cases.85 Nevertheless, he offers no general directions about how
policies are to be clarified and no procedures for the detailed clarification of
specific goals. Furthermore, he has no set of categories (values) or pro-
cedures for relating most general value preferences to the choices that must
be made or recommended in particular instances. In general, Professor
Friedmann manifests a marked reluctance to undertake, explicitly, compre-
hensive goal postulation. For example, in regard to the general problem of
human dignity, he states:
It may indeed be maintained that all law is a law made by human
beings for human beings, and that the respect for the human being,
as an individual rather than an object to be disposed of at will, is
a foundation of all social, and therefore of legal, relations.
86
Yet Friedmann makes no effort to postulate a comprehensive set of goal
values or to elaborate a set of procedures for relating basic values to specific
instances of choice. Rather, returning to rule orientation, he claims that the
same result (in the cited passage) could be reached "by stating that murder or
torture are international crimes, since all civilized legal systems treat them
as criminal offences of the gravest kind."87 Friedmann then hastens to add
that this method will not advance beyond the most elementary postulates.88
If one is seriously concerned with human dignity, the critical question is how
less abstract specifications can be achieved and related by appropriate prin-
83. P. 70. The emphasis is primarily contemplative:
The time has come to attempt at least a tentative ordering of this bevildering
mass of new developments, not only for the sake of classification or as a guide
to a reorientation of the teaching of modem international law in contemporary
universities, but principally as an aid to our understanding of modern legal
problems that have arisen outside the traditional scope and methods of inter-
national law.
84. See pp. 78, 142 n.55.
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ciples of interpretation to choices about particular events. Friedmann gives
no explicit answer to this question, nor does he explicitly state and defend
criteria by means of which international behavior can be evaluated. Implicitly,
of course, Friedmann is evaluating, and the reader will discern the operation
of goals in regard to power, wealth, well-being and, generally, human rights.8 9
The failure to postulate these goals in a comprehensive set and to indicate
procedures for giving content to the higher level abstractions detracts seriously
from the coherence and wider application of Friedmann's argument.
The greater shaping and sharing of the wealth value is cited by Professor
Friedmann as an extant community goal. In applying this goal to the problem
of expropriation, Friedmann presents one of the dearest case analyses of his
book.9 0 The discussions of the power value are considerably less coherent
and, if nothing else, demonstrate the hazards of impressionistic rather than
systematic goal clarification. Friedmann is uneasy about the shifting power
center in the United Nations,91 which represents a wider participation in the
power value, and similarly uneasy about the proliferation of petty sovereignties
in the international arena.9 2 He vacillates on the use of power. Pursuit of
power per se is, according to Friedmann, antithetic to international law, but
pursuit of power as an instrument for achieving other ends is "ethically neu-
tral."9 3 This rather ambiguous formulation is supposedly buttressed by the
author's rather grand statement that he "accepts" the bipolarity of politics, as
resulting from a perpetual tension between "conscience and power," between
"ethical and coercive factors." 94 This adds ambiguity to ambiguity. In the
context of Friedmann's book the components of the bipolarity merge, for
power is, according to the author, "ethically neutral"-an instrument for
achieving a given objective in the national interest (national desired values)
in any given situation. The abuses to which this formulation are susceptible
have already been suggested.
Friedmann's goal clarification is further marred by an apparent miscon-
ception of what is involved in value analysis. The chapter that is devoted to
this matter is less than pellucid.95 He notes that there can be many types of
values and that national interest is a "shorthand expression for the values
being pursued in the name of a given nation state."98 This truism brings one
back to precisely the point from which value analysis should commence. It is
because the term "national interest" is so ambiguous and changing that many
contemporary social scientists and international lawyers reject it or insist
89. See, e.g., p. 325.
90. See pp. 206-10.
91. See pp. 32-34.
92. See ibid.
93. P. 50; see note 12 .spra.
94. Ibid.
95. Pp. 45-59 (ch. 5).
96. P. 47.
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upon precise indices when it is used. One alternative would be an explicit
adoption of the maximization postulate: whatever any participant in the
social process does, he does because he believes, correctly or not, that it is
in his own interest to do so. Some comprehensive set of value categories
could then be employed to ascertain precisely what values are in fact being
pursued in a particular context and how this affects general community in-
terests and the long-term interests of particular participants, as clarified by
the observer. It has been previously noted that Friedmann's "shorthand" use
of national interest creates an artificial dichotomy between national and inter-
national interests and presents an unrealistic "either-or" choice; if in each
situation national interest and general community interest are subjected to
value analysis from the standpoint of an impartial observer, it will often be
seen that "national" and "international interests" are the same.
In sum, Professor Friedmann has neither spelled out in comprehensive
form nor offered techniques for the further specification of the public order
goals for which he, as a scholarly observer, is willing to take responsibility
in making recommendations to the decision-makers and members of the
larger community of mankind. If Friedmann would state his overriding goals
in some comprehensive and systematic form, specifying them in necessary
detail for each value process, he might, thereafter, in assessing decision, test
each choice by the degree of its approximation to his specified goals.
B. Description of Past Trends
Arguably, a book of this size cannot present comprehensive trend studies
of each of the major areas that its author aspires to treat. Even allowing for
this, however, the description of past trends is somewhat meager. In general,
one questions the merit of merely citing by name current controversies such
as Laos or Vietnam as substantiation for an assertion. It is also surprising
to find a case as complicated as that of the Certain Expenses of the United
Nations97 disposed of without examination of some of the more important
difficulties involved.98 The technical unfeasibility of undertaking an intensive
contextual examination of every case does not justify the other extreme.
The more particular difficulties that Professor Friedmann encounters
in describing past trends are, of course, attributable to the absence, already
noted, of a set of categories for the detailed description of the social process
events to which decisions are a response. In default of categories that permit
a stable reference through time and across boundaries for appraisal of the im-
pact of decisions upon general community interests, description must perforce
be largely anecdotal. Thus, despite all the emphasis which Professor Fried-
mann quite rightly gives to the roles of many new actors in the world social
97. [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 151.
98. See p. 15.
[Vol. 65:810
HeinOnline -- 65 Colum. L. Rev. 828 1965
CHANGING STRUCTURE I
process-intergovernmental organizations, private associations, and individual
human beings-he never achieves a systematic and detailed exposition of the
broad participation that these new actors now have in the world arena's most
comprehensive constitutive process of decision. Nor does he attempt com-
prehensively and systematically to describe the protection that the various
new participants are able to secure from the larger constitutive process both
in establishing themselves as legal entities, with a competence for making
claims and being subjected to claims, and in the conduct of activities with
other participants in the shaping and sharing of values.
Much of Professor Friedmann's discussion of past trends has been tele-
scoped into the brief characterization of classical international law as a
process of decision regulating conflict. Insofar as any process of decision
regulates conflict, the characterization is not invalid. But the implication that
national interest in the classical period was advanced only by instruments of
conflict is an incomplete description of the decision process in question and
an inaccurate rendering of the facts. In truth, participants in the international
social process have always sought to secure certain value objectives by means
at their disposal that were deemed effective. Decisions about value allocation
have been taken in a variety of authoritative and/or controlling arenas by a
variety of coercive and noncoercive means. Patterns of decision in certain
areas of endeavor-for example, the law of the seaP-9 have reflected in high
degree a perceived common interest in cooperation. Patterns in other areas
have manifested perceived common interest in a lower degree. Against this
backdrop, "conflict" and "cooperation" as used by Professor Friedmann have
a shifting meaning, referring variously to strategies as employed in the social
process, the responding decision processes or, even, to the resultant patterns
of decision. 100 Friedmann's shift in reference is subtle and confusing.
C. Identification and Analysis of Conditioning Factors
Much of Professor Friedmann's book is devoted to description of
changes in the conditioning factors that affect decision. In the first part of
the book, Friedmann describes and analyzes what he considers the major
changes in interstate relations. The significant features of the traditional or
formative era of international law, according to Friedmann, were: the almost
exclusive participation of a limited number of western Christian states; the
fact that these states, due to a broad political and cultural homogeneity, had
no concern with each others' internal political or social systems; and the rise
of the nation state with a strong doctrine of sovereignty that, among other
things, made the nation state "diplomatically and legally" the only full
99. See McDOUGAL & BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS (1962).
100. A detailed analysis of the normative ambiguity of these terms is presented in
text accompanying notes 109-10 infra.
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subject of international law.'0 ' These factors led classical international law
to a preoccupation with acceptable rules of conduct in international diplomacy
and relatively little concern with the economic or general welfare effects of
such relations.102
In contrast, Friedmann finds that the contemporary international scene
has changed most of these factors. Participation has been opened to a large
number of states of diverse political, religious and social cultures with the
introduction of intense ideological divisions. That rival ideologies hold dif-
fering views about the state and the individual and almost all of their activ-
ities is not novel; what is new is that many formerly "domestic affairs" have
now become matters of international concern. The combination of these two
factors has led international law, according to Friedmann, into a new "vertical"
dimension, which he calls the international law of "cooperation" as opposed
to the traditional international law of "coexistence." As he views this process,
the attempts to regulate and promote, by positive cooperation, in-
terests of common concern on a transitional [sic] level.., add a new
and "vertical" dimension to international relations, and thereby to
international law.10 3
The key to "cooperative law" is either internal similarity or common interest.
Since these factors are not widely shared on a universal scale, the most
effective and rapid development of cooperative arrangements has taken place
between smaller groups of states on a "transnational scale.' 0 4
Another change has been the internal democratization of many of the
state participants. This, according to Professor Friedmann, has made foreign
affairs a matter of domestic policies and has highlighted the close relation
of international and internal law.10 5 Both the rival ideologies and the increased
participation of individuals in international relations has led to a concern
with economic development. It remains a major instrument of policy of
nation states, but has also become subject to public international control
through the instruments of international economic organization. Contemporary
welfare and economic development concerns, according to Friedmann, are
part of the wider concern for survival, which he divides into a concern for
avoidance of national destruction and the preservation of common resources.
The former concern expresses itself in what Friedmann has characterized as
the traditional law of coexistence; the creation of international organizations




104. Pp. 10-11; see pp. 96-114.
105. See p. 7. As was noted above, the concentricity of national and international
arenas is not always clearly expressed. At p. 7 and p. 102, the emphasis is on formal
incorporation. Elsewhere it is on impact of decision in a variety of arenas.
[Vol. 65:810
HeinOnline -- 65 Colum. L. Rev. 830 1965
CHANGING STRUCTURE I
of this concern in that they reflect a growing realization of the futility of
war as an instrument of policy. The concern for the preservation of common
resources, according to Friedmann, has led to a proliferation of international
organizations since there is a growing realization that the enormity of the
task defies the powers of particular nation states. The internationalization
of economic interests, according to Friedmann, has led to a variety of group
loyalties to the interdependence of the world economy and, as a result, to
a variety of new legal forms in international law.
Despite a careful and detailed study of changes in environmental con-
ditioning factors, Friedmann offers no theory for the identification and assess-
ment of the impact of environmental and predispositional variables on decision.
Environmental changes in the world arena are, of course, relevant to policy
only insofar as they affect the perspectives of participants, and in turn, de-
cision. Professor Friedmann tends to lose sight of this, and as a result his
fine treatment of environmental changes goes largely to waste.
Friedmann's discussion of changes in perspectives is much less systematic
than his illumination of environmental changes. This default in performance
is apparently due partly to lack both of an adequate map of the environmental
factors and of a clear delineation of the components of the perspectives of
participants, and partly to lack of a distinction between the objectives of par-
ticipants and the strategies that they employ in order to achieve their ob-
jectives. Thus, Friedmann documents the access of non-European cultural
systems to participation in the international social process. He notes the
divergencies between different cultural systems but concludes that, insofar
as interstate relations are concerned, developing states and capital-importing
states, communist and non-communist states, etc. will use the same law and
substantially the same assertions.106 Challenges to formerly accepted "rules,"
such as prompt and adequate compensation for expropriations, are not, ac-
cording to Friedmann, due to cultural divergences but to immediate economic
interests. 0 7 Despite this general statement, the reader will find that Fried-
mann takes careful note of the effect of cultural homogeneity or divergency in
a variety of discussions.'0 8 Friedmann's general assumption (which even he
cannot follow) that cultural factors do not affect interests, would not appear
to have much support in history. His inconsistency here seems to stem from
a confusion of objectives and strategies. Arguably, a democratic and a totali-
tarian state will conduct their formal interstate relations by means of the
same strategies; but their objectives in terms of immediate and long-range
value allocation will be affected by the more general perspectives that condi-
tion all of their actions, and may differ greatly in particular contexts. Though
106. See pp. 321-22.
107. See ibid.
108. See, e.g., pp. 243, 279.
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culture may in some instances appear to be a relatively unimportant factor,
Professor Friedmann would be hard put to defend his sweeping rejection
of it in its effects on decision.
D. Projection of Future Trends
The distinction between an international law of coexistence and an
international law of cooperation is, according to Dr. Friedmann, the key to
the prediction of future trends. When "conflicts of interest" are supplanted
by a perceived common interest in cooperation in order to achieve maximum
realization of common aims, then a new dimension of international law gen-
erates itself, a "law of cooperation" as distinguished from the traditional
international law of "coexistence." Professor Friedmann notes that coopera-
tion on a universal scale tends to be restricted to matters that are "neutral"
-that is, matters treated similarly in diverse public order systems. In regional
units with more homogeneity, there is, as a result, more transnational or
supranational cooperation. Thus Friedmann distinguishes between a universal
and a regional law of cooperation. 0 9 Apparently, these different international
laws serve as an index of future trends of decision and development. In
Professor Friedmann's words:
[T]he more predominantly technical and correspondingly devoid of
political or social value conflicts a given activity, the more susceptible
is it to universal organization, and also to a transfer of executive and
regulatory functions from the national to the supranational level
of an international authority. Conversely, the more sensitive a certain
activity is to conflicting political and social ideologies, the more
limited will be the scope of the transfer .... 110
The elusive references in this quotation are immediately apparent. What is
"technical" and "devoid of political or social value conflicts" and what is not?
Nuclear energy should be "technical" enough to satisfy the requirement, but
it is certainly politically and socially charged. Why is international orga-
nization developing in that area? What is less technical than basic human
rights? Why so little organizational development? The reader who is so
inclined can continue to play this game for many different areas of human
endeavor, but the point is clear. All this prediction does is announce, after
there is some international organizational development, that the subject of
ecumenical regulation was "technical" and "devoid of political or social value
conflicts." In short, Professor Friedmann's essays in prediction remain post
hoc and anecdotal. This can be attributed to the failure systematically to
perform the other intellectual tasks, as well as to inherent defects in the
split-level approach.
109. See pp. 50-53.
110. Pp. 278-79.
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E. Invention and Evaluation of Policy Alternatives
Even more distressing than the absence of responsible efforts toward
the calculation of future probabilities is the fact that the split-level approach
appears to inhibit creativity in the invention of alternatives to cope with the
insistent problems of world public order. It would undoubtedly be simplistic
to argue that conflict in the contemporary world is monolithic. In the inter-
stices of conflict there is cooperation (or vice versa) and this may be ex-
pected to increase with the changing patterns of identifications of the partic-
ipants in the international social process. In this regard, it is not unreasonable
to observe that (1) nation-states of the world can and are cooperating on
certain matters while doing no more than maintaining an uneasy truce on
others and, hence, that (2) patterns of authoritative decision can be divided
into one process which does no more than maintain the coexistence of states,
and another process which regulates cooperative value production and dis-
tribution. But beneath the surface of this observation there could lurk a
tendency to relieve scholarship of some of the exigency of its responsibility.
It is tempting to assume that coexistence and cooperation are discrete
phenomena, that the international lawyer or scholar can do little about "co-
existence" and that he should concentrate upon developing "cooperation."
One senses a touch of Hegelian mysticism: an increasing quantitative change
on the level of "cooperation" will one day reach a "nodal point" and, magically,
the world will change as the problems of coexistence miraculously disappear.
It might be that Professor Friedmann has fallen into this opiative self-
deception. He discourses ably upon the many areas in which international
cooperation has been achieved and develops his argument that comparative
law can bring legal order to them. The air of optimism sometimes carries
over to the problems of coexistence, but concrete suggestions do not."'
In this area, Friedmann remarks, "principles of national policy and the asser-
tion of what it [a state] rightly or wrongly regarded as the 'national interest' "
generally determines national action.112 Consider, for example, Friedmann's
discussion of indirect aggression: a solution is "unlikely until the intensity
of political and ideological warfare between the nations has abated.""13 This
comment borders on banality; when such warfare has abated, there will be
no necessity for a solution, for there will be no problem. Without a solution,
there may be no future. (More generally, one wonders what Friedmann's
conception of the role of the international lawyer is, either in the present
or in his millenial future?) The split-level approach to international law tends
111. It should be noted that Friedmann expands upon the importance of treating
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toward the same evasiveness as the "legal-political" question doctrine ;114 it
is open to the same criticisms.
The scholarly task of making recommendations for improvement thus
suffers from the "coexistence-cooperation" distinction. Professor Friedmann
fails to acquit himself of this intellectual task in measure proportional to his
eloquent demands for change, on either of his levels of international law. Few
alternative strategies are suggested for the basic problems of "coexistence."
On the highest level of abstraction, Friedmann often vacillates. The author's
discussions of power allocation can serve as an example. At times, Friedmann
foresees a balance of power system, 1 5 at times a bipolar or tripolar system
of superstates on Orwellian lines ;n1 and though he quite validly criticizes
the Sohn-Clark approach, n1 he speaks at times of international federal
government with a federal military or police force.""
The difficulty in stating Friedmann's precise views on the preferred
structure and allocation of power in the international arena is not aided by
the author's general jurisprudential views: Although Friedmann appears to
challenge Austinian formulations and considerably later in his book praises
a functional approach for describing international decision-making, 1 9 his
arguments that international sanctions must be imposed by international
organizations (for example, the new international sanction of preclusion from
participation) and his argument against dddoublernent fonctionnel reveal an
explicitly conscious hankering for an Austinian sovereign. 120
The suggestion of policy alternatives is meager even on the level of
cooperation. Despite Friedmann's sanguine predictions of developments on
the cooperative level, the author frequently indicates-on matters as basic as
welfare agencies and human rights-a very pessimistic notion of the role of
law in social change.' 12
The artificiality of the distinction between the laws of "coexistence"
and of "cooperation" should by now be clearly apparent. All the actions of
participants in the international social process are taken, it is assumed, for
what is perceived to be self-interest in an attempt to maximize overall value
positions. In certain value processes, it is widely perceived that self-interest
can be achieved through cooperation; self-interest is supplanted by a perceived
common interest. In these value processes, recurring patterns of decision
114. See DE VisscHaa, -THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
75-78 (1957). For a critique of the traditional doctrine, see LAUTIU'ACHT, TE FUNCTION
or LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL CommuNrrY (1933).
115. See pp. 85, 260-61.
116. See p. 214.
117. P. 276; see CLARE & SOHN, WORLD PEACE THROUGH WoLD LAW (2d ed. 1960).
118. See pp. 18, 94.
119. See pp. 275-77.
120. Frequent references have already been made to Professor Friedmann's minimiza-
tion of unorganized processes of decision. For explicit, sovereign-oriented statements,
see pp. 119, 153, 370. "[T]he international legal order reflects a condition intermediate
between national and international sovereignty." P. 294.
121. See p. 285.
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give rise to institutions which can have positive effects as a conditioning
factor in other value processes where self-interest clashes. Such other value
processes, in which effective elites think (possibly correctly) that their
objectives are better served by protracted conflict than by cooperation, are
the primary problems for contemporary international law. Assuming that
the interest in cooperation is strong enough, it may be possible to manipulate
this interest so as to modify or regulate the areas of conflict. If the distinction
between coexistence and cooperation is employed in this sense-that is, as a
strategy for community decision-makers-then it is justified. If, on the other
hand, it is used to circumvent the pressing problems in the so-called law of
coexistence, it hinders rather than helps the cause of world order. Professor
Friedmann's insistence on two kinds of law ignores that both are merely
instruments in one comprehensive interdependent process in which security,
in the sense of freedom from the fact and threat of unauthorized coercion,
affects all other values and all other values in turn affect security. As a result,
the dubious distinction which he has taken such trouble to draw hinders
rather than helps his important enterprises.
CONCLUSION
The aspiration to create a new theory of inquiry about international law
which infuses and inspires Professor Friedmann's book is indeed a magnificent
one. Seldom has the need for such intellectual creation been more eloquently
and cogently stated. All who cherish the values of a public order of human
dignity must, similarly, both admire the honesty and courage demonstrated
by Professor Friedmann in grappling with fundamental problems for which
he can see no solution and applaud his more ultimate vision of a well-organized
world arena in which men have security and the freedom effectively to
cooperate in the abundant shaping and sharing of values. Every serious
student of international law must, further, now be in his debt for a brilliant
panoramic survey of important contemporary problems.. Yet so long as
Professor Friedmann is not able to establish and maintain an observational
standpoint that clearly distinguishes between general community and partic-
ipant member perspectives; or to delimit a conception of international law
that focuses attention upon it as a comprehensive and continuing process
of authoritative decision in which the peoples of the world, in unorganized
as well as organized interactions, clarify and implement their common interests
with respect to all values; or to identify and systematically to perform the
various specific intellectual tasks indispensable to policy-oriented inquiry-so
long also will he be unable to rise to his own challenge and create not "a
mere classification of materials" but "a general legal theory" that will promote
his long-term community goals.m
122. The quoted words are taken from FRmDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 129 (4th ed.
1960).
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